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The Visions of Ten Country Experts
Dana M. Muir 
Stephen M. Ross School of Business, 
University of Michigan
John A. Turner 
Pension Policy Center
At a time when many countries have aging populations and econo-
mies continue to struggle in the aftermath of the global fi nancial crisis, 
the improvement of pension systems is especially important. Pensions 
often are critical in preventing retirees from living in poverty. Pensions 
enable older workers to retire. In order for retirees and workers to rely 
on pensions, the funding and administration of those pensions must be 
affordable and sustainable for workers, business, and society.
The theme of the 2010 conference of the European Network for 
Research on Supplementary Pensions (ENRSP or the Network) was an 
exploration of how and why the image of the ideal pension system dif-
fers across countries. The organizers recognized that views on the ideal 
pension system for a country may evolve in reaction to changes in the 
economic and demographic environment. The conference recognized 
the importance of the various long-run goals that different actors have 
for the pension system. The conference focused on country-by-country 
studies. It was expected that the conference authors would have very 
different approaches to thinking about the characteristics of the ideal 
pension system, and the authors did not disappoint. 
This introductory chapter begins with a brief overview of the coun-
try studies. By necessity this overview omits much of the nuance of the 
chapters—the goal is to provide a short explanation of each country’s 
2   Muir and Turner
pension system and summarize the reforms proposed by the author of 
the country study. 
The summaries are intended to establish some background for the 
second section of this chapter in which we address some broad themes 
drawn from the country studies. We consider the authors’ views on the 
importance of culture in explaining differences in approaches to pension 
issues. We also refl ect on four primary goals for any pension system:
1) coverage of the population so that pensions are broadly 
available,
2) risk sharing so that the many risks inherent in any pension sys-
tem are appropriately shared,
3) adequate benefi ts to meet the country’s goal of suffi cient retire-
ment standards, and
4) approaches to respond to increases in longevity.
Given our backgrounds, we view the complex pension systems de-
scribed in this chapter through a U.S. lens. 
To decrease the confusion that results from using different terms 
for essentially similar pension concepts, we adopt U.S. terminology in 
this chapter and throughout the rest of the book, even when different 
terminology would typically be used elsewhere in the world. So, for 
example, pension schemes (British terminology) are referred to here as 
pension plans or pension systems. And the government-administered 
portion of a country’s pension system is typically referred to as social 
security.
NORTH AMERICA 
United States, John A. Turner and Dana M. Muir
The U.S. pension system is the only North American system cov-
ered in this book because, given the focus of the Network, the emphasis 
is on European pension systems. The U.S. and Japanese systems are 
included in the volume as points of comparison and discussion.
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The U.S. pension system requires nearly all workers to participate 
in the social security system, which provides a defi ned benefi t pension 
to workers who meet minimum criteria. In addition, the U.S. provides 
tax incentives for employer-sponsored pension plans, which may be de-
fi ned benefi t or defi ned contribution plans, and for individual retirement 
savings in accounts such as Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). 
The social security plan is the only mandatory plan. Sponsorship of de-
fi ned benefi t or defi ned contribution plans by employers is voluntary, as 
are individual savings accounts. Employer-sponsored plans have been 
heavily regulated since 1974. In spite of various incentives intended 
to increase coverage of employer-sponsored plans, however, coverage 
rates have never exceeded much more than 50 percent. 
Numerous interest groups recognize that planned and potential 
reductions in the social security system, limited coverage of employer-
sponsored plans, poor uptake of individual plans, and the transition 
from defi ned benefi t to defi ned contribution plans means that the U.S. 
pension system needs reform. Turner and Muir briefl y discuss some 
of those proposals, which advocate very different approaches. Turner 
and Muir conclude that the importance of individual freedom in U.S. 
culture means that the voluntary nature of the employer-sponsored pen-
sion system should be retained. Still, Turner and Muir believe that the 
current system can be modifi ed to enhance coverage, better allocate 
risks, and increase adequacy of benefi ts. As an example, they advocate 
measures, including changes in tax and funding rules, that would help 
equalize the attractiveness to employers of defi ned benefi t and defi ned 
contribution plans. One example is a recommendation to permit em-
ployee tax-deductible contributions to defi ned benefi t plans. They also 
suggest that the demographic issue of an aging population that is so 
costly to employer-sponsored defi ned benefi t plans could be addressed 
in part by reallocating some of the demographic risks. The plans could 
retain the idiosyncratic risk of longer than average life expectancies 
for individual workers, while the cohort risk could be shifted to plan 
participants as a group.
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EUROPE
Although the eight European countries studied in this volume (ex-
cept Switzerland) all are members of the European Union (EU), the 
pension systems vary considerably in terms of structure, coverage, risk 
sharing, adequacy, and approach to increasing longevity. 
United Kingdom, Bryn Davies
The United Kingdom (UK) has a two-part mandatory pension 
system administered by the government (social security) that in com-
bination applies to all employees, is earnings related, and provides a 
defi ned benefi t pension. A move is under way to transform the earnings-
related benefi t to a fl at-rate benefi t (not related to earnings but increas-
ing with years of contributions) and to increase the retirement age. The 
United Kingdom also has a system of voluntary employer-sponsored 
pension plans, which may be either defi ned benefi t or defi ned contri-
bution plans. Beginning in 2001, most employers that do not offer a 
pension plan meeting minimum standards must designate what is 
known as a “stakeholder” plan to receive employee contributions from 
those employees who wish to contribute, although neither employers 
nor employees are required to contribute to these plans. The UK pen-
sion system, other than the social security pension, essentially remains a 
voluntary system of defi ned benefi t or defi ned contribution plans where 
risks are borne almost completely by the employer or the employee 
depending on the type of plan. 
Davies advocates a four-part system. The fi rst two parts would be 
mandatory systems administered by the government (social security). 
Together they would provide a fl at-rate benefi t at 60 percent of me-
dian household income for a single person and an additional amount 
depending on the individual’s lifetime earnings. In addition, Davies 
proposes an incentivized pension at the occupational or other collective 
level. The combination of this collectively based earnings-related pen-
sion and the social security benefi ts would provide individuals with a 
pension that would meet the target replacement ratio. Finally, Davies’s 
proposal calls for a fourth component for individuals who desire a more 
generous pension. The government would facilitate that component 
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through regulation but would not necessarily encourage savings into 
that component.
Ireland, Gerard Hughes and Jim Stewart
Ireland’s pension system has a mandatory government-administered 
pension (social security) that is paid as a fl at-rate defi ned benefi t. It has 
an additional two-part system for private sector employees. Employ-
ers may provide either defi ned benefi t or defi ned contribution plans for 
their employees. The trend has been for employers to shift their spon-
sorship from defi ned benefi t to defi ned contribution plans. Individuals 
not covered by an employer-sponsored pension plan may establish an 
individual pension plan. Over the past 10 years, the pensioner poverty 
rate has been volatile. In recent years, the social security benefi t has in-
creased more quickly than workers’ earnings, and the at-risk-of-poverty 
rates for pensioners decreased to slightly more than 11 percent in 2008. 
Hughes and Stewart propose a universal social security system 
that would further decrease or eliminate the risk of poverty for pen-
sioners in Ireland. They show that the current social security system 
provides most of the income for most pensioners, and only those in the 
top quintile of the income distribution derive a signifi cant portion of 
their total pension income from an employer-sponsored or individual 
pension plan. Hughes and Stewart advocate decreasing the tax relief for
employer-sponsored and individual pension plans and suggest reallo-
cating those resources into the social security system to improve that 
system’s ability to support pensioners in an equitable and sustainable 
manner. 
Denmark, Finn Østrup
The government of Denmark administers a universal social security 
pension system that provides defi ned benefi ts. Also, the Danish pen-
sion system includes employment-based defi ned contribution plans that 
cover nearly all employees. These plans arise from centralized wage 
agreements or company policies and have guaranteed minimum rates of 
interest. In addition, workers are encouraged to participate in personal 
pension plans by tax incentives. 
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In addressing risks to pensioners, Østrup observes and criticizes 
the political uncertainty in the Danish pension system. He explains 
multiple instances where the government of Denmark has changed the 
taxation of plan benefi ts and sought to use pension plan assets to fund 
business enterprises, including troubled fi nancial institutions in 2008. 
Østrup points out that, compared to other industrial countries, Denmark 
has a very low household savings rate. Østrup also concludes that the 
complexity of the Danish pension system results in a lack of transpar-
ency. After detailed analysis comparing funded and unfunded pension 
systems as well as defi ned benefi t and defi ned contribution benefi t 
structures, Østrup concludes that there is no single optimal pension sys-
tem. In his view, optimality in a pension system depends on the broad 
spectrum of goals of the pension system, including not just income re-
placement after retirement but also effects on labor supply and fi nancial 
markets. 
Germany, Markus Roth
Germany has the oldest social security system in the world. It pro-
vides an income-related defi ned benefi t. It also has a voluntary system 
of pensions that is made up of employer-sponsored plans and individ-
ual pensions, but that system is moving from an employer-sponsored 
system to one that has elements of employee fi nancing. The voluntary 
system covers approximately 60 percent of the German workforce but 
often provides only a small benefi t. New forms of plans have been in-
troduced in Germany, such as a defi ned benefi t with a guaranteed return.
Roth observes that the German law on both individual and occu-
pational pensions needs to be systematized. His view is that defi ned 
benefi t plans are not categorically more appropriate than defi ned con-
tribution or hybrid plans for individual and occupational pensions. 
Roth advocates use of a pension protection triangle and a loyally ad-
ministered separate fund to model protective principles. Roth’s pension 
protection triangle is formed by consideration of exit (termination of 
a pension contract), voice (consultation), and guarantees. He makes 
a number of specifi c suggestions to improve Germany’s occupational 
pensions, including recommending the use of automatic enrollment in 
defi ned contribution occupational pension plans.
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Belgium, Kim De Witte
Belgium’s pension system has a mandatory government-
administered component (social security) that covers all workers, is 
income-based, and is paid as a defi ned benefi t. In addition, employers 
may, but are not required to, sponsor defi ned benefi t or defi ned contri-
bution plans for their workers. Approximately 60 percent of workers 
are covered by a work-related pension plan. Many of these plans are 
industry-wide plans that arise from collective bargaining rather than 
plans that are sponsored by individual employers. One somewhat un-
usual provision of Belgium’s pension regulation is a requirement that 
defi ned contribution pensions include a minimum guarantee rate, cur-
rently 3.25 percent for employer contributions and 3.75 percent for 
employee contributions. Finally, in addition to the social security and 
work-based pension plans, Belgium permits voluntary individual pen-
sion savings arrangements on a defi ned contribution basis.
After discussing the shortcomings of the current pension system 
in Belgium, De Witte explains the reform proposals advocated by the 
main social and political groups. De Witte then develops a compre-
hensive set of criteria to evaluate the reform proposals and evaluates 
various approaches to pension accrual against the broad categories of
• degree of redistributive solidarity,
• scope of risk sharing, and
• protection of pension rights. 
Each of these broad categories is defi ned by subcategories. So, 
for example, longevity is an explicit factor in the scope of risk sharing 
category and an implicit factor in the protection of pension rights cat-
egory through subcategories that differentiate between lump sum and 
annuitized benefi t entitlements. De Witte advocates an ideal system for 
Belgium that would include a social security benefi t of 60 percent of 
fi nal salary and an additional amount of up to 15 percent (for a maxi-
mum total of 75 percent of fi nal salary) from tax-incentivized individual 
or work-related pensions. 
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France, Lucy apRoberts and Pierre Concialdi
The French pension system is a government-administered man-
datory system that covers all private sector workers by providing a 
means-tested minimum pension and work-related pensions as defi ned 
benefi ts (social security). Fewer than 8 percent of retirees receive the 
minimum means-tested benefi t. Mandatory work-related supplementary
plans provide about one-third of the pension benefi ts received by the 
average retiree. The supplementary work-related plans are organized 
along occupational lines, but the plans have been increasingly consoli-
dated. The replacement rate achieved by the French system is among 
the highest in Europe. 
apRoberts and Concialdi preface their discussion of prospective 
changes in the French social security system with a concise history of 
the development of the current system. They then take issue with the 
French government’s projections for the future of the country’s pension 
system and state that the government believes that it is not possible to 
increase pension contributions. apRoberts and Concialdi believe that 
the cumulative nature of the many changes that have taken place in the 
French pension system will, if left unchanged, result in drastically re-
duced pensions in the future. They argue that the French social security 
system can and should be reinforced to receive increased revenues and 
pay appropriately generous benefi ts. They also point out the linkage be-
tween full and well-paid employment and levels of retirement income 
security. In any pension system with a work- and income-based pension 
component, unemployed and underemployed individuals will not earn 
the pension benefi ts they would in a system of full employment with 
well-paid jobs.
Switzerland, Matthieu Leimgruber
Switzerland has two mandatory components to its pension system 
and a voluntary third component. The Swiss government adminis-
ters a mandatory social security plan that covers all workers and pays 
earnings-related defi ned benefi ts. In addition, the mandatory work-
related benefi t plans cover approximately 90 percent of the workforce 
and constitute an increasingly large proportion of the expenditure in 
Switzerland on pensions. Coverage by this component of the Swiss sys-
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tem is less than universal because there is a wage fl oor, which results 
in the exclusion of low-wage and temporary workers. The work-related 
plans are required to provide a minimum guaranteed return on invested 
assets. The third component of the Swiss pension system is made up of 
voluntary individual pensions. 
Leimgruber engages in a historical analysis of the Swiss pension 
system, concentrating on the work-related pensions that have attracted 
signifi cant controversy in recent years. He argues that specifi c pension 
reforms that may appear merely technical matters must be understood 
in the larger context of the multiple components of the Swiss pension 
system and the dynamics that affect that system. In early 2010, Swiss 
voters rejected a proposal that would have reduced those benefi ts. 
Leimgruber observes that the development of the mandatory work-
related pension system was designed in part to improve the levels of 
pension benefi ts and in part to discourage the enhancement of the so-
cial security system. He explains the important role he believes that 
business forces, including the providers of pension investments and ser-
vices, such as life insurers that provide group pension contracts, have 
played in the structure of the Swiss pension system. Leimgruber expects 
that the work-related component of pensions will become increasingly 
important in debates over the provision of pensions. 
Poland, Marek Szczepański
The pension system in Poland underwent signifi cant reform in 
1999, resulting in two side-by-side systems. Szczepański addresses 
only the structure of the pension system as it applies to individuals who 
were below age 30 at the time of the reform. The government of Poland 
administers a mandatory notional defi ned contribution system (social 
security). A second component provides funded defi ned contribution 
benefi ts and a third component that is voluntary also is defi ned con-
tribution. The pension system is made up of both work-based pension 
plans and individual pension plans. The voluntary third component cov-
ers only about eight percent of the workforce. Szczepański concentrates 
his analysis on the problems associated with the voluntary defi ned con-
tribution component of the Polish pension system. He establishes an 
analytic framework that divides the barriers for development of the 
occupational portion of the voluntary component into exogenous and 
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endogenous factors. He further divides exogenous factors into variables 
of institutional or noninstitutional character. Szczepański divides the 
endogenous factors into employer- and employee-related variables. He 
concludes with specifi c recommendations for improving pension cov-
erage, improving adequacy of pension benefi ts, and mitigating both 
fi nancial market and longevity risks. For example, he suggests that 
workers could be automatically enrolled, with an opportunity to opt 
out, into voluntary work-based plans to increase coverage. To increase 
the adequacy of pension benefi ts, he suggests equalizing the statutory 
retirement age of women with the retirement age for men, which cur-
rently is 65. Finally, he observes the importance of limiting fees and 
charges in a defi ned contribution system. 
ASIA
Japan, Noriyasu Watanabe
Understanding the Japanese pension system provides context for the 
views of the European contributors to this volume. Japan administers a 
compulsory earnings-related pension plan paid as a defi ned benefi t that 
supplements the basic pension, also provided through the government 
(together forming social security). Two different types of work-related 
pension plans may be established by employers. Both types are defi ned 
benefi t and played an important role until 2001, when pension reform 
fi rst permitted defi ned contribution plans, amended work-related pen-
sion systems, and introduced a new corporate defi ned benefi t plan. The 
new defi ned contribution plans may be either work related or set up by 
an individual. 
Watanabe’s analysis shows a number of weaknesses in the 2001 
reform. For example, he notes two problems with defi ned contribution 
plans. First, Japan does not have the strict fi duciary responsibility regu-
lations that are important in maintaining the integrity of any defi ned 
contribution system. Second, the lack of transparency and fairness in the 
Japanese fi nancial markets is dangerous for defi ned contribution plans. 
Watanabe particularly criticizes the past approach to corporate pension 
policy for its concentration on addressing minor technical issues instead 
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of the broader structural issues. His recommendations include a call for 
greater understanding of the importance of strong employee welfare 
systems in contributing to profi table corporations and the role for pen-
sion plans in those systems. Among other recommendations, he also 
calls for a full review and reconstruction of all social security systems 
in Japan. 
BROAD THEMES DRAWN FROM THE COUNTRY STUDIES
Although the country studies are intended to stand alone, in this 
section, we draw some broad themes from the country studies. One of 
the many advantages of the Network is the ability to exchange ideas 
on common approaches, issues, and solutions. Similarly, the Network 
provides a forum for respectful professional debate and disagreement. 
Importance of Culture in Explaining Differences in Approaches 
Underlying pension systems is a complex web of cultural consid-
erations. Those considerations may affect the technical choices of a 
pension system, and they may also affect the broader policy goals that 
are inherent in the structure of pension systems. A careful reader will 
see, sometimes explicitly, but more often implicitly, the effect of culture 
on the various country systems studied here.
For example, Turner and Muir believe that the high priority placed 
on individualism in U.S. culture should constrain the mandates imposed 
on U.S. employment-based and individual retirement plans. In contrast, 
in Watanabe’s study of Japan, he observes the importance of the large 
number of companies that have been in business for hundreds of years. 
This pattern of business longevity is often attributed to harmony between 
a company and its employees (as well as between the company and its 
customers and society) and a history of lump-sum severance payments 
that dates from the seventeenth century. The importance placed on the 
relationship between a company and its current and past employees can 
be seen in Watanabe’s recommendation that stable employee welfare 
systems, particularly pension plans, contribute to corporate profi tability. 
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These cultural norms of individualism in the United States and of 
corporate responsibility in Japan stand in stark contrast with the current 
and ideal systems discussed in some of the European country studies 
in which government programs are recognized as being the primary 
route to reliable and reasonably generous pensions. In France, the 
government plays the primary role in the provision of pension ben-
efi ts. The mandatory defi ned benefi t pensions provided through the 
programs of the French government, combined with marginal employer-
provided and individual pensions and property income, provide a 
standard of living for pensioners equivalent to that of other French 
households. apRoberts and Concialdi argue that the French system of 
governmental pension provision should be retained and cutbacks that 
have occurred over time should be rescinded.
Similarly, Hughes and Stewart show that the government-provided 
social security pension in Ireland provides the largest share of income 
for households headed by a person aged 65 and over. Not only are 
government-provided pensions viewed as an acceptable source of pen-
sion income in Ireland, Hughes and Stewart argue that resources from 
the current tax support of nongovernmentally provided pensions should 
be shifted to government pensions because it would result in a fairer 
and sustainable pension system.
Even in the United Kingdom, which perhaps has the closest his-
torical and cultural position to the United States among the countries 
considered in this book, the Pension Commission suggested in 2005 
that the government should provide a fl at-rate pension at a level that 
would prevent pensioner poverty. The Pension Commission then sug-
gested an opt-out earnings-related pension for the next supplemental 
tier of the pension system. The fi ndings to date of behavioral economics 
teach us that in operation an opt-out system comes very close to being a 
mandatory system. Davies goes even further and argues that second tier 
earnings-related pensions should be mandatory. 
In contrast with these other European countries, Szczepański argues 
that Poles do not want to rely on the government of Poland exclusively 
for pension provision in part because of historical experience. In 1999, 
Poland put into effect a complicated new pension system, leaving in 
place the old system for individuals who were aged 50 or older on the 
date of implementation. The new individual and work-related pensions 
authorized and encouraged by that reform have not resulted in signifi -
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cant rates of coverage by those plans. The Polish people, thus, appear to 
have become skeptical of relying too heavily on government involve-
ment in the pension system. 
In addition to the European cultural acceptance of a larger role of 
government in pension provision than in the United States, solidarity is 
also an important norm in many European countries. This norm can be 
seen in the Belgian system. Solidarity across workers is refl ected in the 
industry-wide pension plans that cover approximately 60 percent of the 
workforce in Belgium. De Witte identifi es three types of redistributive 
solidarity and categorizes alternative types of pension accrual, in part, 
according to the type of redistributive solidarity provided. Ultimately, 
redistributive solidarity is one of the evaluative criteria De Witte sug-
gests be used in identifying an ideal pension system for Belgium. Davies 
states that some redistribution is appropriate for pension systems and 
that it plays an especially important role in pensions for women because 
of their lower average wages.
Insights on Specifi c Topics
Improving coverage 
Although widespread pension coverage through nongovernmental 
pension programs is not unheard of, most of the countries studied in this 
book have voluntary employment-based pension systems that achieve 
only moderate levels of workforce coverage. Switzerland, however, 
mandates work-based pension systems and has achieved coverage of 
about 90 percent of its workforce. The exceptions are low-wage and 
part-time workers because the Swiss mandate has a wage fl oor. Bel-
gium also appears to have one of the strongest systems of workplace 
pension provision. De Witte attributes its high coverage rate at least 
in part to the fact that many of the plans are industry-wide collectively 
bargained plans. 
In contrast to Switzerland and Belgium, less than half of Irish retir-
ees over age 65 reported receiving a work-related pension. Poland is an 
even more extreme example of the low end of the coverage spectrum—
only 2 percent of workers are covered by work-related pension plans. 
The country experts appear to be in general agreement that there are 
three ways to increase coverage rates in work-related pensions. Pension 
systems could do three things:
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1) make work-related pension provision mandatory,
2) make participation in work-related pensions the default with an 
opt-out opportunity, or
3) increase the incentives for sponsorship and participation in 
work-related pensions.
A number of countries, including Ireland and the United States, 
have tried the third approach (i.e., tax incentives) for a number of years. 
The problems observed with this approach include that tax incentives 
are of less value to lower paid workers than to higher paid workers and 
that lower paid workers have less disposable income to contribute to 
retirement plans. 
Not surprisingly, then, given the cultural norms against mandates 
in some countries, multiple country experts suggest that the second 
approach, that of coverage defaults with opt-out opportunities, could 
be an appropriate way to increase pension coverage. Interestingly, this 
approach is suggested in countries that have quite different pension 
systems and cultural histories. For example, Szczepański believes that 
defaults may be useful in Poland, and Turner and Muir make a similar 
suggestion for the United States. Turner and Muir also acknowledge, 
though, that there is a danger in defaults in the United States because the 
system permits distributions from plans for hardships or when workers 
change employers. If individuals are not committed to pension savings, 
they may decide to take early distributions, even though they are penal-
ized by the U.S. tax system.
Sharing risks 
The global fi nancial crisis reinforced the importance of risk in pen-
sion systems. All of the country experts raised concerns about a broad 
spectrum of risks. The global fi nancial crisis highlighted the risk that an 
employer might voluntarily, or upon its bankruptcy, terminate a defi ned 
benefi t plan, resulting in reduced benefi ts for current or future retirees. 
In defi ned contribution plans, the decline of fi nancial markets has re-
sulted in lower account asset levels and dropping interest rates. 
Financial market risks and reform proposals related to the benefi ts 
provided by defi ned benefi t and defi ned contribution plans are some-
what diffi cult to categorize because, in part, they are specifi c to the 
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details of a country’s pension system. Nuances that are important in a 
given country are lost as this summary becomes quite general. As an 
example, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan 
are the only countries with a formal insurance program for defi ned ben-
efi t plans, and those programs decrease the employee risk of employer 
bankruptcy in those countries. But other countries widely use insurance 
contracts that are quite stable to prefund work-based defi ned benefi t 
plans, and these contracts also reduce plan risks. Roth discusses the 
use of book reserves recorded on a company’s balance sheet in lieu of 
a separate fund for occupational pensions in Germany. This is changing 
as German companies, especially large ones, revise their approach to 
meet international accounting standards. 
Financial market risks are not the only pension plan risks observed. 
Both Szczepański and Watanabe suggest that fi nancial market regula-
tions in their respective countries, Poland and Japan, are insuffi cient to 
appropriately protect individuals who depend on defi ned contribution 
plans for their pensions. Szczepański and Østrup note that a history of 
governmental amendment or proposed amendment of pension regula-
tions in Poland and Denmark, respectively, imposes risks on the pension 
systems. Szczepański explicitly recognizes the skepticism of Poles 
toward government policymakers and states it is a source of Poles’ pref-
erence not to be entirely dependent on a government-provided pension 
system. apRoberts and Concialdi discuss the series of technical changes 
made by the French government to its pension system that are projected 
to signifi cantly reduce future pensions. They counter this risk by argu-
ing that the governmental system is the safest and most appropriate 
choice for France, but that it needs to be restored to prior levels. Relat-
ing to the political risks affecting benefi t levels, Leimgruber recounts 
the recent rejection by Swiss voters of provisions that would have de-
creased pension benefi ts. 
Providing adequate benefi ts 
Most if not all of the country studies discuss the question of how 
much pension is required to provide adequate benefi ts. In accordance 
with traditional concepts in pension policy, most country experts write 
in terms of replacement income. That, of course, simply rephrases the 
real question as: what level of replacement income is necessary to pro-
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vide adequate benefi ts? The authors consider the answer to that question 
as a percentage, often relying on policy documents or studies in their 
home countries to set an approximate appropriate standard. Davies’s 
discussion for the United Kingdom is reasonably indicative. He looks 
to World Bank policy and a 2004 UK Pensions Commission report to 
conclude that replacement rates should be between 65 and 75 percent 
for those earning median incomes. In the proposed system, replacement 
percentages would be set to provide higher percentages for low-income 
earners, and there would be a fl at-rate fl oor to prevent pensioner poverty.
Østrup, in comparison, approaches the question from the perspective of 
the goals of the pension system and Danish culture. He points out that 
consumption goals in retirement may be highly individualized, may de-
pend on a standard of living relative to a reference group such as those 
who practice the same profession as the retiree, or may depend on the 
standard of living the retiree enjoyed while employed. 
Even to the extent that country experts agree as a general matter 
with this approach, they do not necessarily agree on how to calculate 
the replacement percentages and what should happen after the pension 
begins. Should replacement percentages be determined on the last wage 
earned, or should there be some averaging of earnings over a prere-
tirement period? And, if the pension is indexed once payments begin, 
how should that indexation occur? apRoberts and Concialdi argue that 
France’s change from indexing to current wages to indexing to current 
prices will result in lower pension payments and will deprive French 
retirees of their fair share of gains in labor productivity.
Responding to increased longevity
Increased longevity may affect pension plans on the previously dis-
cussed aspects of dimensions of risk and provision of adequate benefi ts. 
From a risk standpoint, in a defi ned benefi t plan where the pensioners 
outlive the expectations under which the plan was funded, costs will be 
higher and additional funds will need to be contributed to the plan. In an 
unfunded defi ned benefi t plan, costs similarly increase, perhaps beyond 
the ability or willingness of the funding entity to maintain the plan and 
benefi ts. In a government-funded plan, this may raise the specter of 
political risk. And, if indexation is insuffi cient, pensioners receiving de-
fi ned benefi ts will see their pension income whittled away by infl ation. 
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In a defi ned contribution plan, the risk is that an especially long-
lived pensioner might outlive the account assets even if the pensioner 
is reasonably conservative in making account withdrawals. That, of 
course, overlaps with adequacy risk. Similarly, since many defi ned 
contribution plans permit benefi ts to be paid as a lump sum, pensioners 
may have the choice to be the opposite of conservative, resulting in a 
decreased or completely exhausted pension in later years. 
Turner and Muir offer a proposal to help counter the longevity risk 
of increased defi ned benefi t plan costs. They suggest that U.S. law be 
amended to permit defi ned benefi t plans to shift the cohort risk to plan 
participants, who are better able than employers to bear that risk. They 
observe that the idiosyncratic risk of longer-than-average life expectan-
cies should remain on the plan, which is better able than individuals to 
bear that particular risk. 
CONCLUSION
In this chapter we briefl y summarized the pension systems of the 
countries studied as well as examined some of the most signifi cant 
themes that we observed in the studies. We provide these summaries 
not as a digest of all of the important ideas that can be drawn from the 
individual chapters, because the country experts provide a wealth of 
insights and thoughts about the ideal pension system for each of their 
countries. Instead, we hope the themes provide a basis for our readers 
to delve deeper into this book and a platform to compare the proposals 
and perspectives of this group of pension experts. 
